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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-ADMISSIBILITY IN A FEDERAL
COURT OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED BY STATE OFFICERS-In response to
a call from a citizen whose suspicions had been aroused by the actions of the
defendant and a companion, Maryland police unlawfully arrested the companion and searched the premises occupied by him and the defendant. &
a result of this search, money was found which had been stolen in the District of Columbia. Although the search was illegal under Maryland law
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, this money was used as
evidence to convict the defendant of housebreaking and larceny in the
District of Columbia federal court. On appeal, held, conviction reversed and
remanded for a new trial excluding such evidence. As the evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution, it should be excluded on principle
and as a matter of sound judicial policy even though only state officers participated in the unlawful proceedings. Hanna v. United States, (D.C. Cir.
1958) 260 F. (2d) 723.
At common law the admissibility of evidence at a trial was not affected
by the illegality of the means of acquisition.1 In light of the constitutional
protection against illegal searches and seizures, however, the federal courts
have excluded all evidence thus obtained by federal officers.2 In Weeks v.
United States,3 the Supreme Court stated that since the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the states, evidence illegally obtained by a state officer
would be admissible in the federal courts. The Court, however, did not directly· consider whether the act involved in that case violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In the later case of Wolf v. Colorado4 it was held that
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is implicit in the "concept
of ordered liberty" and consequently is embodied in the protection afforded
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless,
the Court in Wolf further held that whether evidence obtained by an unconstitutional act is admissible in state criminal proceedings is a question not
controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment, but is for the states to decide. 5
Even after the Wolf case lower federal courts have continued to allow, on
the authority of Weeks, the introduction of evidence illegally acquired by

l: 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

3d ed., §2183 (1940).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 Id. at 398.
4 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See 50 CoL. L. REv. 364 (1950), for a good discussion of this ·case:
.5 But see the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in that
case,. where it is argued that such evidence should -be excluded from state criminal
proceedings.
2
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state officers.6 In reaching a contrary conclusion the court in the principal
case stated that Wolf had overruled the idea upon which the Weeks decision
had predicated the allowance of state-seized evidence-the idea that such
state action is not unconstitutional-and that therefore Weeks is no longer
controlling authority. 7 The court's reasoning, however, seems erroneous.
Weeks stated only that such actions by state officers did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, and the effect of Wolf was merely to extend through
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment the unconstitutionality of illegal
searches and seizures to state action. This extension did not affect the ultimate question whether the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion of evidence which, though illegally seized, was not obtained in violation of
that amendment.
Whether the holding of the principal case is sound may depend on how
the federal rule which excludes illegally-seized evidence is characterized.
Generally this rule has been interpreted as merely a rule of evidence.8 In
support of this view, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has indicated that the admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence is largely a matter of judicial discretion9 and has also stated that without a rule of exclusion the ,Fourth Amendment might as well be stricken from the Constitution.10 The implication of such statements is that the exclusionary rule is
not embodied in the Constitution, but rather is merely designed by the
courts to insure protection of the constitutional freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure. The state courts which admit such evidence have emphasized that exclusion neither curtails the unconstitutional acts nor punishes
the offenders, but instead aids the guilty party to the detriment of society.11

6 E.g., Watson v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 910; Williams v. United
States, (9th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 695; United States v. Moses, (7th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d)
124, where it is said at 125 that the duty of the federal courts to enforce the Constitution
"neither necessitates nor justifies the exclusion of evidence so obtained by state officials.
Weeks v. United States. . . ." See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), which
stated in dictum that the federal government could avail itself of evidence improperly
seized solely by state officers.
7 Principal case at 726.
8 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). See also Wolf v. Colorado, note 4 supra,
concurring opinion at 39, where Justice Black stated that he agreed with the majority's
implication that the rule is judicially created and not a command of the Fourth Amendment. See also Rule 26, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 18 U.S.C. (1952). For discussions on the
admissibility of evidence acquired through an illegal search and seizure, see 134 AL.R.
819 (1941); comment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1304 (1951).
9 See Irvine v. California, note 8 supra, at 134.
10 See Weeks v. United States, note 2 supra, at 393. Concerning other methods to
protect a citizen from violations of his constitutional rights, see Rudd, "Present Significance of Constitutional Guarantees Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 18
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1949). For a discussion of remedies available to a citizen for
unreasonable searches and seizures by police, see Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights," 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
11 E.g., State ex rel. Kuhle v. Bisignano, 238 Iowa 1060, 28 N .W. (2d) 504 (1947);
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This reasoning, however, should not cause a reversal of the principal case
since the intended federal protection from invasions of privacy is extended
to everyone and there has never been any indication that such protection
is to enure only to the innocent.12 The central thesis of the Supreme Court's
position regarding exclusion has not been that federal agents should not
obtain the tainted evidence but, rather, that federal courts should not
make use of it. In view of this, it would be incongruous to hold that a
federal court must protect a citizen's constitutional right when the actions
of a federal officer are involved but need not afford protection of the same
right merely because a state officer was the wrongdoer. As a rule of evidence
controlling federal courts, the rule of exclusion was thus properly applied
in the instant case.
The other possible basis for the inadmissibility of such evidence in the
federal courts is that exclusion is commanded by the Fourth Amendment. 13
Before it can be determined whether the evidence in the principal case
must be excluded on this basis, however, it is necessary to determine the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The purpose of this amendment may
be singular in that it is merely to protect a citizen from unreasonable
search and seizure by federal officers. This purpose is effectuated, first, by
prohibiting federal officers from engaging in the unconstitutional acts, and,
second, if they do violate this rule, by excluding all evidence obtained as
a result of their unlawful conduct. Thus under this view the evidence obtained by state officers in the principal case through a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment need not be excluded, as the Fourth Amendment
would have no effect on the state action. If on the other hand the purpose
is dual-first, to prohibit federal officers from unconstitutional searches and

Huff v. State, 82 Ga. App. 545, 61 S.E. (2d) 787 (1950). Cases which exclude evidence
obtained ·by illegal search and seizures are State v. Hunt, (Mo. 1955) 280 S.W. (2d) 37
and People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955), which overruled previous
decisions in California and followed the rule of exclusion on the ground that it was
the only way to enforce the constitutional guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For adoption of the exclusionary rule by statute, see N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §15-27; R.I.
Gen. Laws (1956) §9-19-25; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) tit. 8, art. 727a.
12 See People v. Cahan, note 11 supra, where the court stated that it is impossible to
protect ,the rights of innocent people if the police are permitted to justify unreasonable
searches and seizures on the ground that they assumed their victims were criminals.
13 See WoH v. Colorado, note 4 supra, at 28, where it is said: "In Weeks . . . this
Court held that ... the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through
an illegal search and seizure." See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Irvine
v. California, note 8 supra, where it is stated that such "unconstitutional" evidence should
not ,be used in state criminal proceedings. But compare the majority opinion of Justice
Douglas in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), allowing an injunction against a
federal officer to prevent him from using illegally-seized evidence as the basis of testimony
in a state court, on the ground, not of constitutional mandate, but supervisory power
over federal officers. See generally Grant, "Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding
Use of Illegally Seized Evidence," 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 60 (1941), where the writer
criticizes the constitutional basis for the rule of exclusion.
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seizures and second, to prevent federal courts from availing themselves of
any unconstitutionally obtained evidence14-then the evidence in the principal case acquired through a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
must be excluded. Of the two interpretations, the sounder view would
recognize only the single purpose. Certainly it is hard to conceive that the
Fourth Amendment is a direction toward federal courts independent of
any acts of federal officers, 15 particularly when the language of the amendment specifically prohibits only the act of unreasonable search and seizure.
It would thus appear that the exclusion of evidence in the principal
case on the basis of a constitutional command would be quite tenuous. The
result, which can safely be supported as a rule of evidence, nevertheless is
sound in giving efficacy to the constitutional mandate requiring freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure.
Robert ]. Paley

14 See
15 See

Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Irvine v. California, note 8 supra.
Ohief Justice Warren's statement in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 at
102, n. IO (1957), to the effect that: "It has remained an open question in this Court
whether evidence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible
in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment." Apparently Chief Justice Warren feels
that the Fourth Amendment may not operate to preclude a federal court from availing
itself of such evidence. His statement also seems to indicate that the Weeks case, which
stated that such evidence is admissible, may no longer be controlling.

